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REPORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY PANEL

26-27 JUNE 1980
(Approved by STAP on 19 September 1980)

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Report of the 17th Meeting of the DCI's Science and Technology Advisory Panel (STAP), 26-27 June 1980

The Panel met on 26-27 June 1980 and received briefings on and discussed the following subjects:

a. Agency Planning

c. Soviet Semiconductor Manufacturing

d. Future Communications

An informal discussion was held with Bruce Clarke and Evan Hineman on STAP help for NFAC, ELINT, and reviewing NFAC production.

CIA LONG-RANGE PLANNING

Special Assistant to the DCI, briefed STAP on the Agency's long-range plan, which he described as still evolving. Last July (1979) in response to STAP recommendations, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence sent a memorandum to the Executive Committee (ExCom) asking that a study of the Agency long-range planning process be undertaken by the ExCom Staff. A long-range issues planning paper was produced. The paper concluded that although the Agency is doing well in planning, improvements are in order. The staff will now evaluate the present planning and management issues, recommend areas for improvement, and identify long-range planning issues. This should be completed by November.

Weekly meetings of Agency planners are being held. They have found a number of already-existing planning programs. For example, The Office of Data Processing has an Agency-wide long-range plan; NFAC has a 5-year plan; and the Office of Communications has a 9-year plan. The next step will be to identify major foreign policy and management issues. This raises a number of questions. Should, or can, the two lists be linked and interrelated? Should they be tied to resources? If so, how will the Agency comptroller fit into the planning? How much detail should be included?

In the discussion that followed, STAP agreed that the Agency was facing up to the issues in planning and approved of the approach to the planning to resources. STAP feels the process is the most important benefit of long-range planning, not the production of a formal planning document; it must be a continuous process that actively involves top management. Constant support is important and is necessary for R&D planning. Some concern was expressed by STAP that the planning process described was not for the entire Intelligence Community, but only CIA. Exemplary projects should be publicized within the Intelligence Community as instances of successful planning. STAP feels the SIGINT plan is an example of an excellent plan for a single area, but plans of this sort should be tied in with others, not created and used in a vacuum. STAP expressed concern that the planning period is only five

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years, a period often too short when lead-times of 10 to 20 years are involved in scientific and technical areas.

STAP emphasized that the real value of the planning exercise is that it forces the participants to go through the planning process, rather than forcing the production of a report or product.

CIA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Chief, Planning and Resources Staff, DDS&T, briefed STAP on the Agency's R&D Plan. The principal goals of the R&D Plan he identified were: 1) support for the Operations Directorate; 2) enhancement of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service; 3) complete and timely exploitation of new types of imagery; 4) CIA support for the SIGINT Program 5) continued support to National Intelligence Programs; and 6) planning and execution of an Agency-wide RD&E program responsive to and consistent with the other goals, as well as the requirements of the Administration Directorate and the National Foreign Assessment Center.

Overall the two major requirements of the plan are to enhance productivity throughout the Agency and to furnish a capability to respond to world events, particularly in increasingly hostile environments. Because of these factors, the highest quality equipment for sensors, collection, communications, security and processing must be used everywhere--overseas and domestically at Headquarters and in the field. Previously there were relatively few areas of the world that required the best equipment.

A number of problems result. A lack (or reduction) of official presence in some areas often makes it difficult or impossible to put equipment in place; Another problem area is the lengthening lead-time required to produce equipment. This leads to higher costs, because of inflation, and missed opportunities to gain intelligence because of a lack of new equipment.

Because resources are not keeping pace with requirements, productivity must be enhanced.

Future improvements for the Agency as a whole appear to be limited by the growth of available funds. The RD&E program funds will grow in excess of 5 percent real growth per year. Growth of this size will

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allow only modest endeavors to be undertaken in other areas, and it will not allow more than one other significant program simultaneously. The RD&E costs are becoming overshadowed by the high costs associated with producing many copies of multipurpose devices. High production costs are becoming an increasing problem and some development work has been cancelled because of this.

STAP feels that the Agency R&D Plan appears to be well developed with clear goals and requirements, and that budget restraints will make prioritization increasingly important. The beginnings of a new program that will have major impact some years downstream should not be short-changed in the budget crunch for shorter-term projects with early results. The R&D Plan should be responsive to both DDO and NFAC priority needs.

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SOVIET SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING

OER, briefed STAP on Soviet semiconductor production. 25X1
The Soviets, compared to other producers, started late in manufacturing semiconductors. In 1969 they were producing only about 100,000 units compared to 30,000,000 in the United States at that time. In 1973 they launched a major effort to acquire foreign technology to build plants.

Soviet current output is 25X1
300-400,000,000 units per year and this expansion has been dependent upon Western equipment. 25X1

Although most Soviet production is based on Western designs, the CMOS processor appears to be of indigenous Soviet design. This may indicate their realization that they cannot copy others indefinitely or they will be severely hurt in the long run. Some analysts believe they may already be so far behind the West that they cannot catch up.

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In the discussion, STAP expressed concern about the flow of equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union. Although some US companies, are very sensitive to the loss, 25X1
others appear indifferent. It will be extremely difficult to stem the flow entirely because there are so many sources for technology.

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FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS

CIA's Director of Communications, briefed STAP on his office's problems and plans for the future. Most communications equipment in use today is extremely old. Although it is still working, there are increasing instances when it cannot handle the steadily rising volume, which puts a tremendous load on the people operating the systems.

As in other areas of the Agency, inflation is causing problems in replacing aging equipment. In constant dollars, the budget is decreasing slightly while the cost of equipment is rising. In addition, the Office of Communications is losing experienced personnel, putting a heavier burden on those remaining.

The Office of Communications is currently confronting the following issues:

+ Information Handling--how does the bureaucracy handle the tremendous flow of information.
+ Interagency Relations--COINS is the main issue, particularly the problems with different levels of security.
+ Narrative vs "Full Service" (Packet) Network.

+ Recruiting Incentives--how to attract and keep good people with outdated equipment, and noncompetitive pay?
+ Terrorism--the threat of capture or bodily harm and the means of combatting it. There is an increased personnel departure rate because employees do not want to go overseas, for either safety or financial reasons.
+ Demography--changes in the population: people have different interests than 20-30 years ago; more women now are in the work force; and the United States is approaching zero population growth.
+ Investment Strategy--how should the Agency meet the new high-technology needs with available resources?

STAP thinks that communications clearly are a vital function and that maximum efforts should be made to keep the Agency current with new technology. In line with this, efforts should be made to join communications with data processing. It should also be borne in mind in today's planning that downstream, in the mid or late 1980s, there may be compelling needs to link overseas stations with Headquarters systems such as SAFE and to allow for heavy demands for communications.

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